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abstract
One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowl-
edge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropri-
ate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by
Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to
acknowledge the distinction between rst-order and higher-order knowledge: the
high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide
three objections to Williamson’s account: (i) his account delivers counterintuitive
verdicts about what it is appropriate for a high-stakes subject to do; (ii) the
high-stakes subject doesn’t need iterated knowledge in order to be regarded as
appropriately relying on the relevant proposition in practical reasoning; (iii)
Williamson’s account doesn’t provide a good explanation of why the high-stakes
subject would be blameworthy if she were relying on the relevant proposition in
her practical reasoning.
introduction
Our ordinary epistemic assessments of action seem to suggest that knowledge sets the epi-
stemic standard for appropriate practical reasoning. If I know that my car is parked in the
yard, it seems that I am entitled to use that my car is parked in the yard as a premise in my
practical reasoning. Conversely, if I fail to know that my car is parked in the yard, it seems
that I am not entitled to the premise that my car is parked in the yard and hence would be
vulnerable to blame if I used that premise in my reasoning. Such considerations motivate
the following claim often referred as the knowledge norm of practical reasoning:
KNP. One knows a proposition iff that proposition is an appropriate premise in practical
reasoning.1
Despite its popularity, KNP leads to an immediate objection to what is considered an
orthodoxy in epistemology,moderate invariantism. Moderate invariantism can be charac-
terised, roughly, as the view that epistemic terms such as ‘know’ invariably refers to an
epistemic standard that (i) exclusively depends on truth-relevant factors and (ii) can be
1 Prominent upholders of the knowledge norm of practical reasoning include Hawthorne and Stanley
(2008) and Williamson (2005) among others. Since the target of this paper is Williamson (2005), I
use his formulation of the knowledge norm in that paper.
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met quite easily. Following DeRose, the phrase ‘truth-relevant’ roughly denotes factors
that “affect how likely it is that the belief is true, either from the point of view of the sub-
ject or from a more objective vantage point” (DeRose 2009: 24). Examples of
truth-relevant factors are a belief’s safety and the reliability of its forming processes. By
sticking to certain intuitive judgments, we can quickly derive a rejection of moderate
invariantism. Suppose that for a low-stakes subject S it is not very important to be
right about whether some proposition p is true, but for a high-stakes subject S* it is
very important to be right about whether p is true. Also suppose that S and S* believe
p on the same, good but not very robust, epistemic grounds (e.g., a memory about
what happened two weeks ago).2,3 Intuitively, S can readily rely on p in practical reason-
ing, but S* can appropriately rely on p only after taking some extra-precaution. Thus we
have:
1. p is an appropriate premise for S’s practical reasoning
1*. p is not an appropriate premise for S*’s practical reasoning
By applying KNP to S and S* respectively, we get:
2. S knows p iff p is an appropriate premise for S’s practical reasoning
2*. S* doesn’t know p iff p is not an appropriate premise for S*’s practical reasoning
From (1) and (2), we have:
3. S knows p.
And from (1*) and (2*), we get:
3*. S* doesn’t know p.
(3) and (3*) together are incompatible with moderate invariantism according to which
if S knows p and S* is as epistemically well-positioned with respect to p as S is (i.e., they
share the same epistemic grounds), then S* also knows p.4
In order to avoid a derivation of (3*), moderate invariantists have to reject either (1*)
or (2*). On the assumption of the truth of intuitive judgments in (1) and (1*), most mod-
erate invariantists have so far rejected KNP and hence (2*) (e.g., Brown 2008; Reed 2010;
Gerken 2011). Although Timothy Williamson is also a moderate invariantist, as the main
proponent of knowledge-rst epistemology he has reason to endorse KNP. As he says,
“without KNP the concept of knowledge would lose some of its signicance: one reason
why it matters whether you know something is that, if you do, you are entitled to use it in
2 Concrete examples include DeRose’s bank case and Cohen’s airport case among others (DeRose 1992:
912; Cohen 1999: 58).
3 Here I assume a sense of ‘epistemic grounds’ which includes only truth-relevant factors.
4 Another parallel argument against moderate invariantism with (1) and (1*) as premises can be built
based on a meta-linguistic knowledge norm of practical reasoning. According to this norm, a
rst-person present-tense ascription of ‘know’ with respect to a proposition is true in a context iff
that proposition is an appropriate premise for practical reasoning in that context (see Williamson
2005: 227–8 for the full argument).
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ways in which you would not otherwise be so entitled” (Williamson 2005: 228). In his
response to the above objection to moderate invariantism, Williamson (2005) thus sug-
gests maintaining KNP and proposes an error theory of our intuitive judgment in (1*).
According to this error theory, although p is an appropriate premise for both S and S*,
neither of them knows that she knows p, and thus neither knows that p is an appropriate
premise. However, given the high stakes, S* needs to know that p is an appropriate prem-
ise in order to be regarded as appropriately relying on p in practical reasoning. Mere
knowledge of p is not sufcient (Williamson 2005). Since Williamson’s account appeals
to the lack of iterated knowledge in explaining away the intuitive judgment about high-
stakes cases, we can name his account the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes
cases.5
The aim of this paper is to provide three criticisms to Williamson’s account. Here is the
plan of the paper. In §1, I illustrate Williamson’s account in more detail. In §2–§4, I pro-
vide three objections to Williamson’s account: (i) Williamson’s account delivers counter-
intuitive verdicts about what it is appropriate for a subject to do in high stakes; (ii)
contrary to what Williamson claims, S* doesn’t need higher-order knowledge in order
to be regarded as appropriately relying on p in practical reasoning; (iii) Williamson’s
account doesn’t provide a good explanation of why S* would be blameworthy if she
were relying on p in her practical reasoning.
1. the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases
Williamson’s account of our assessments in (1) and (1*) has two key steps. First, by
appealing to the non-luminosity of knowledge, Williamson argues that even though S
and S* know p, neither of them knows that she knows p. Second, Williamson argues
that in order to be regarded as appropriately using p as a premise in practical reasoning,
S* (but not S ) must possess second-order knowledge. Let us consider each step in more
detail.
Concerning the rst step, a condition is luminous just in case whenever one is in it, one
is in a position to know that one is in it. According to Williamson, only trivial conditions
are luminous; for instance, those that obtain in all cases or in none. By constructing a sor-
ites series between a case in which the condition clearly obtains and one in which it clearly
fails to obtain, Williamson argues that luminosity must fail close to the boundary between
cases where the condition obtains and cases where it does not, just on the obtaining side
5 Another challenge for moderate invariantists, derived from the same sort of cases, relies on a conict
between intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions: intuitively, it seems felicitous to ascribe
knowledge that p to S but not to S*. In response to this challenge, Williamson provides a psychological
bias account. According to this account, it is natural for us to assign more weight to considerations tell-
ing against knowledge ascription when possibilities of error are made psychologically salient. Features
such as the high practical costs of error for the subject or the ascriber, or the possibilities of error
described in vivid and convincing detail can make the possibilities of error psychologically salient
(Williamson 2005: 226). When we focus on considerations telling against the ascription of knowledge
to the subject, we tend to withdraw the positive ascription of knowledge and to deny knowledge to the
subject (Williamson 2005: 234–5). Note that the psychological bias account cannot deal with the argu-
ment based on KNP considered in the main text. This is why Williamson introduces the account dis-
cussed in this paper.
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(Williamson 2000: Ch. 4). Neither knowing a proposition nor being an appropriate prem-
ise for practical reasoning are trivial conditions. Hence they are non-luminous conditions.
It follows that in some cases one is not in a position to know that one knows q even if one
knows q. Likewise, in some cases one is not in a position to know that the fact that q is an
appropriate premise even if q is an appropriate premise. Given KNP, q is an appropriate
premise iff one knows q. Hence, when q is an appropriate premise but one is not in a pos-
ition to know that q is an appropriate premise, one in effect knows q without being in a
position to know that one knows q (Williamson 2005: 230–1).
For what concerns S and S*, due to the setting of the cases, according to Williamson,
although both of them have the relevant rst-order knowledge that p, neither of them is in
a position to have second-order knowledge. This is because their knowledge falls into
cases close to the boundary between knowledge and ignorance, just on the knowledge
side. This seems to be plausible given the specic setting of the cases. All low-high-stakes
case pairs are conceived in a way that the epistemic grounds shared by the low-stakes and
the high-stakes subjects are not very strong, merely sufcient to convey the intuition that
the subject in the low-stakes case knows.
As for the second step, according to Williamson, the fact that a subject relies on an
appropriate premise without being in a position to know that it is appropriate provides
some potential reason to question or criticise the decision. How harsh we should be
with the subjects in such cases depends on how much is at stake. As Williamson says,
“If not much, then it seems unreasonably pedantic to condemn the reasoning. But if mat-
ters of life and death are at stake, the charge that the agent was not in a position to know
that the premise was appropriate becomes more serious” (Williamson 2005: 230). Thus,
given the practical situation of S* (high stakes on whether p), in order to be regarded as
appropriately treating p as a premise in her reasoning, it is not sufcient for S* to be
merely in a position in which it is appropriate for her to rely on p; rather, S* should
also know that p is an appropriate premise.
Williamson seems to hint that the second-order knowledge requirement on high-stakes
subjects is related to a corresponding requirement to engage in second-order reasoning
about whether to trust the rst-order practical reasoning. For example, he writes
(where ‘Hi’ refers to S* and ‘Lo’ to S ):
[H]i has far more reason than Lo to check on such practical reasoning, to engage in second-order
practical reasoning about whether to trust the rst-order practical reasoning. Since Hi is in no pos-
ition to know that the rst-order premise that [p] is appropriate, the second-order premise that the
rst-order premise is appropriate is, although true, inappropriate (given [KNP]). Thus
second-order reasoning is in no position to give a clean bill of health to rst-order reasoning
based on the premise that [p] (Williamson 2005: 232–3).
Given the high stakes situation that S* faces, S* has far more reason than S to check
whether she can rely on her rst-order reasoning, i.e., whether she can trust that p is an
appropriate premise for her practical reasoning and thus, given KNP, whether she
knows p. Williamson suggests that this second-order reasoning requirement is prudential:
it would be highly imprudent for S* to directly rely on p without engaging in a
second-order reasoning about whether it is appropriate to use p as a premise in practical
reasoning, and without reaching a positive answer to that question through this
second-order reasoning (Williamson 2005: 233).
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Combining the non-luminous condition with the second-order knowledge requirement,
Williamson explains the intuitive judgment in (1*). According to the second-order knowl-
edge requirement, S* needs to have second-order knowledge of p in order to be regarded
as appropriately using p as a premise in her practical reasoning. But according to the non-
luminosity condition, S* is not in a position to have second-order knowledge of p. Thus
we deem that all things considered it is inappropriate for S* to use p as a premise in her
practical reasoning, even though p is indeed an appropriate premise for her practical
reasoning.
Williamson also adds that if the stakes are high enough, a prudent subject should
engage in even higher orders of reasoning – third, fourth, and so on – about whether
to trust the previous-order reasoning (Williamson 2005: 233). In addition, Williamson
shows how a failure to have n + 1 iterations of knowledge that q in deliberation could
end up leading to a self-denial of knowledge that q. Williamson invites us to consider a
dialogue in which one interlocutor rst asks another (who could also be herself) whether
q is the case; then, provided a positive answer, the interlocutor asks whether she can pro-
vide warrant for the answer she just gave. The interlocutor continues asking the same
question for each positive answer. Sooner or later, the interlocutor under interrogation
would run out of warrant. Williamson argues that when this happens, previous positive
answers will in turn be destabilised in a domino effect. Similar consequences apply
when one considers whether one has warrant for various levels of higher-order knowl-
edge. When one nds out that she lacks warrant for some higher-order knowledge of q,
all lower-order knowledge of q will be in jeopardy as well. This shows that a failure of
some higher-order reasoning in providing justication for the lower-order reasoning
would in the end hinder one from relying on the target proposition in her rst-order prac-
tical reasoning (Williamson 2005: 233–4). This allows moderate invariantists to deal with
cases in which high-stakes subjects have second-order (or even higher-order) knowledge.
In such cases, the seeming lack of rst-order knowledge and of warrant to rely on it can be
accounted in terms of a lack of some higher-order knowledge.
2. counterintuitive appropriateness
In this section I argue that Williamson’s account delivers very counterintuitive verdicts
about what it is appropriate for a subject to do in high stakes. According to
Williamson, both S and S* satisfy KNP’s conditions for appropriate use of p as a premise
in practical reasoning. Two clarications are in order about the notion of ‘appropriate-
ness’ used in KNP. First, there is an issue about how to understand KNP as an epistemic
norm. According to one obvious and widely acknowledged understanding, KNP is an epi-
stemic norm in the sense that it demands that a certain epistemic condition with respect to
q be satised in order to rely on q in practical reasoning. In a narrower sense, KNP is an
epistemic norm in the sense that its normative source comes from an epistemic standard as
opposed to a different normative standard (prudential, moral, aesthetic, etc.).6 It’s likely
that Williamson has the narrower sense in mind.7 Here, for the sake of argument, I will
6 On this point see, for example, Crisp (2005). For a discussion of different sources of normativity see, for
example, Broome (2013: 26–7 and Ch. 7).
7 Compare to his discussion of the norm of assertion in Williamson (2000: Ch. 11).
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assume this interpretation. Second, following Hawthorne and Stanley (2008: 578),
‘appropriateness’ in KNP should be conceived as permissibility rather than obligation.
With these clarications in mind, it doesn’t sound quite right to say that S* would do
anything epistemically permissible if she were using p as a premise in practical reasoning.
We might be able to see the point more clearly by looking at a concrete example. Since
Williamson uses Cohen’s airport case as the target example in his paper, the case I suggest
is a modication of that one:
Trustful Airport
Mary and John are at the Los Angeles airport contemplating taking a certain ight to
New York. They want to know whether the ight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear some-
one ask another passenger, Smith, if he knows whether the ight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at
the ight itinerary he got from the travel agent and responds, “Yes I know – it does stop in
Chicago.” Mary and John have to deliver an organ for an urgent transplant on a patient in
Chicago. They are aware of the fact that in some rare cases the itinerary could contain a misprint
or the schedule could have been changed at the last minute. Still, they rely on the information they
overheard from Smith without any further check about the itinerary. It turns out that the itinerary
used by Smith is reliable and provides the correct information.
It seems that Mary and John should collect more evidence and should have a stronger
epistemic position in order to be justied enough to rely on that information in their
practical reasoning. But according to moderate invariantism, since Smith knows that
the plane stops at Chicago (henceforth r), and Mary and John acquire a true belief of r
based on Smith’s reliable testimony, Mary and John also know r. Then according to
Williamson’s account, it is appropriate for Mary and John to use r in their practical rea-
soning (assuming that they acquire knowledge by that testimony).
If we take seriously Williamson’s account, we should be able to distinguish at least two
kinds of evaluation about the subjects’ practical reasoning. One evaluation would be
about the epistemic permissibility of relying on r in one’s practical reasoning; the other
would concern other evaluative standards relevant in judging the subject’s decision-
making, e.g., prudence. In terms of the habit of decision-making exhibited, it is indubit-
able that Mary and John are utterly imprudent in relying on r without searching for
any further evidence for r.
Now, when there are multiple evaluative standards according to which an action can be
assessed and they deliver opposite verdicts, normally we can easily tell those standards
apart from one another and acknowledge a conict between the respective evaluative
judgments (at least from a third-person perspective fully informed about the facts). For
instance, we can easily distinguish epistemic assessments from moral assessments in the
following case concerning assessments relative to assertion: While I may know that the
fugitive is in the basement, and so satisfy the epistemic standard required to appropriately
assert that the fugitive is in the basement, this assertion would violate a moral rule if my
behaviour hinted at the presence of the fugitive to the enemy soldiers (McKenna 2015: 4).
Consider another case sharing the same structure of evaluation as the case of Trustful
Airport. Suppose that Jimmy stops at the red light of a very busy crossroad. Suppose that
he is in a country in which people respect trafc regulation only ‘moderately’. So he knows
that without paying careful attention to vehicles passing by, he could end up having an
accident. Nonetheless when the trafc light turns to green Jimmy immediately starts the
j ie gao
6 epistemeuse, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.30
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. KU Leuven Libraries, on 31 Aug 2017 at 15:43:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
engine and drives off without checking any further. Luckily, Jimmy passes the crossroad
without incurring any accident. In this case, we can easily distinguish two levels of assess-
ment, one positive and one negative: according to the trafc regulations, Jimmy hasn’t
done anything wrong and should not be subject to any sanction considered by the law.
On the other hand, Jimmy’s action was imprudent. He should have checked more care-
fully whether some vehicle was coming from the other direction – or, as Williamson
may suggest, he should have engaged in second-order reasoning about whether it was
appropriate for him to proceed.
However, in Trustful Airport, a similar distinction between different standards seems to
be absent. Intuitively we (as third-person observers fully informed of the facts) don’t hold
Mary and John as epistemically appropriate but prudentially irresponsible. Rather, it
seems that our assessments about their decision to rely on the information they overheard
are completely negative. In this case, we can only recognise a unique negative evaluation
(be it prudential or epistemic), not two evaluations driving different directions as would be
the case if Williamson were right. Thus holding, as Williamson does, that Mary and John
have met the knowledge norm of practical reasoning is at most a theoretical speculation
not supported by any intuitive judgment.
One might challenge this argument by asking why normative standards should t with
our intuitive judgments. In particular, one may argue that intuitive judgments go wrong in
such cases precisely because these are borderline cases in which the subject is blind about
whether she knows or not, as Williamson’s account predicts. However, this possible reply
misses the point. First, even if the subject in a borderline case were not in the position to
recognize the double evaluation, we as third-person assessors fully informed about the
facts and the epistemic position of the subject should have no problem in discerning
these evaluations. Second, even from a rst-person perspective, we should distinguish
between on the one hand knowing that there is a norm and what it requires in general,
and on the other hand knowing whether the conditions in the current circumstances con-
form with the norm’s demands. For example, consider someone driving through a cross-
road who knows that the law requires stopping at red lights but is not in the position to
discern whether the light is green or not due to scarce visibility conditions. In this case, one
knows that there is a norm requiring from her a specic thing but cannot know whether
her action fulls that requirement. Similarly, Williamson’s account predicts that the high-
stakes subject does not know whether she knows q and whether it is appropriate for her to
rely on q. However, it does not predict that the subject is blind about whether the epi-
stemic and prudential standards are in force in the context. But our intuitive judgment
about relevant cases is not merely that the subject is uncertain about the assessments
according to these standards. Rather, in these cases, intuitively there is only one standard
in force involving a negative assessment on relying on q, also from the subject’s perspec-
tive. In other words, while Williamson’s account predicts that the assessments relative to
these norms (whether the subject is acting appropriately in the circumstance) may not be
transparent to the subject, it does not say anything about whether the enforcement of the
norms is transparent to her (whether the subject knows, for example, that there is a
knowledge norm governing the use of propositions as premises in her reasoning). But
in order to avoid my objection, one would need the latter type of blindness, not the
former.
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3. higher-order reasoning/knowledge and practical rationality
The second objection focuses on the higher-order reasoning/knowledge requirement in
Williamson’s account. More precisely, I will question the following claim:
(HORK) Engaging in higher-order reasoning and/or having iterations of knowledge of q is neces-
sary and sufcient in order for a high-stakes subject to be regarded as appropriately using q as a
premise in her practical reasoning.
If HORK is false, Williamson’s account of our intuitive judgments about the problematic
cases in terms of second-order reasoning/knowledge is undermined.
My objection to HORK relies on a preliminary clarication of the relation between
higher-order reasoning/knowledge and degrees of rst-order warrant. It’s not clear how
we should understand this relation. According to one understanding, having higher-order
knowledge of q is related to the strength of epistemic position with respect to q, measur-
able in terms of degrees of rst-order warrant. For instance, one may argue that the closer
to epistemic certainty the rst-order knowledge is, the safer the corresponding higher-
order beliefs are, and the higher the order of knowledge the subject is in a position to
have. Since under such an understanding, having further iterations of knowledge is
made possible by having stronger rst-order warrant, one may question the relevance
of talking of higher-order knowledge. Indeed, rst-order warrant may be doing all the jus-
ticatory work, and an account of the relevant cases that focuses directly on degrees of
rst-order warrant (e.g., Gerken 2011, 2015, Forthcoming) would be a simpler, straight-
forward alternative.
In fact, I think that higher-order knowledge should be carefully distinguished from
degrees of rst-order warrant. First-order warrant and knowledge iterations are very dif-
ferent properties. This is evident if one observes that sometimes certain methods are good
for the acquisition of one of these properties but not the other (e.g., higher-order reason-
ing can increase the number of knowledge iterations without adding rst-order warrant).
Higher-order knowledge is about lower-order attitudes, not directly about the strength of
one’s epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. Performing second-order
reasoning and consequent acquisition of second-order knowledge about q cannot alone
strengthen the rst-order warrant with respect to q. Rather, rst-order warrant seems
to depend exclusively on rst-order evidence supporting q.
It is worth noting that the above considerations stand even if one conceives rst-order
warrant in terms of reliability or safety of one’s rst-order belief. Williamson observes that
belief’s safety from error only grants that one is in a position to have a certain number of
knowledge iterations (see Williamson 2000: 116 and Appendix II). Nonetheless, for actu-
ally possessing this iterated knowledge, the subject should draw deductively the pertinent
conclusions from what she knows. This implies that when the safety of rst-order belief
necessary for one’s being in a position to have these knowledge iterations is already in
place, higher-order inferential reasoning can increase the number of knowledge iterations
without adding reliability to rst-order belief and rst-order warrant.
Moreover, to the extent that degrees of rst-order warrant are much more ne-grained
than the number of iterations of knowledge, it follows that the two properties have differ-
ent extensions. Assume, as is plausible in many ordinary cases, that degrees of rst-order
warrant are related to degrees of safety of rst-order belief: the stronger the warrant for
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believing q, the more remote the cases in which q is false from those in which q is true, and
the safer the belief that q. Now, in the Williamsonian framework, different degrees of
safety of rst-order belief can grant the same safe margin from error sufcient for, and
only for, putting one in a position to have a specic number of knowledge iterations Kn.
This implies that a specic number of knowledge iterations is compatible with different
degrees of rst-order warrant. On a topological conception of safety like that discussed
by Williamson (2000: §5.3), we can think of margins for error as limits of regions in an
n-dimensional Euclidean space. The distance between the margin for safely believing q
and the margin for safely safely believing q can occupy several points in the region, each
of which corresponds to a different degree of reliability or rst-order warrant. This implies
that the reliability and rst-order warrant of one’s belief can be strengthened without
necessarily enabling the subject to be in a position to have more iterations of knowledge.8
Furthermore, there are also reasons to separate the strength of rst-order warrant from
rst-order belief’s reliability (and consequently from the knowledge iterations one is in a
position to have). Consider a trivial condition C. Examples include conditions one is
always in (e.g., I exist), and conditions which cannot be unsafely believed because they
obtain in every possible world (e.g., necessary truths and tautologies). According to
Williamson, C is a luminous condition, one that a subject is in a position to know that
it obtains whenever it obtains. Consider a belief about condition C. Such a belief enjoys
maximal safety. Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument cannot prevent possible innite
knowledge iterations about this condition. However, it seems that no matter how good
the subject’s evidence in support of the obtaining of C already is, new evidence would fur-
ther strengthen her rst-order warrant for that condition. For example, no matter how
well supported my maximally safe belief in the law of excluded middle is,9 if I come to
know that some famous mathematician discovered a new theorem which further conrms
the truth of the law, my rst-order warrant for my belief will be further strengthened by
this new evidence.10
It follows from the above discussion that there are cases in which a subject is in a pos-
ition to acquire innite knowledge iterations but doesn’t have maximal rst-order war-
rant. We can also conceive opposite cases in which a subject has very robust rst-order
warrant for q but does not have higher-order knowledge of q. We have already appre-
ciated the fact that for actually possessing higher-order knowledge, the subject should
deduce the pertinent conclusions from what she knows. One can have a very strong
8 If one nds a topological conception too abstract, one is free to think of more concrete examples in
which new evidence is sufcient to strengthen one’s belief reliability but not enough to pass the thresh-
old for making the belief reliably reliable. For example, I can discriminate a slight increase in the heat of
a surface between time t1 and t2. Furthermore, my perception of the heat at both times is of a degree
sufcient to grant the safety of my belief that from t1 the surface has been more than 30 degrees
Celsius, but insufcient to grant a safely safe belief in the same proposition. Thus, the reliability of
my belief at t2 is higher than the reliability of my belief at t1, but both of them are not enough to
make my belief reliably reliable. See Williamson (2000: §5.3) for further discussions and examples.
9 I am here assuming that this truth is presented to me in a simple tautological guise, i.e., I have the con-
cepts to formulate the tautology. See Williamson (2000: 107–8).
10 The latter consideration relies on the crucial point that while safety from error is a modal property of
belief, warrant is a property related to the actual support that a certain body of evidence provides to a
proposition. Some Bayesian epistemologists have suggested specic methods to measure this kind of
support. See Joyce (2005) for an overview.
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rst-order warrant but fail to have higher-order knowledge simply because one doesn’t
engage in deductive second-order reasoning and thereby doesn’t form the relevant higher-
order beliefs.11 In addition, there are also cases in which it is at least physically impossible
for the subject in possession of a strong rst-order warranted belief that q to form higher-
order knowledge that q. Such cases are possible with subjects who have difculties in
forming higher-order attitudes and engaging in higher-order reasoning, such as young
children and subjects who lack the concept of knowledge.12
Once we accept that having higher-order knowledge can diverge in important ways
from having strong rst-order warrant, we are in a better position to assess HORK.
First, engaging in higher-order reasoning and having multiple iterations of knowledge
seem to be unnecessary for being regarded as appropriately using q as a premise in prac-
tical reasoning in high stakes situations in which the subject’s epistemic position with
respect to q is extremely strong or reaches the maximal degree. Consider an analogue
of the bank case in which the evidence held by Keith that the bank will be open tomorrow
(henceforth b) is that just a minute ago he read the bank’s opening hours in front of the
bank and also got a conrmation about that from the staff working at the reception
desk.13 In this case, it seems that the strength of Keith’s epistemic position with respect
to b is pretty robust. Given the massive evidence Keith has for the proposition on
which he acted, should we really blame him for not asking himself whether he really
knows b, whether he knows that he knows b . . . and for not forming a second, third
. . . n-order belief about the matter? There is a clear intuition here that Keith is fully blame-
less in this situation. It seems obvious that Keith cannot be criticized for directly relying on
b in his practical reasoning without rst engaging in higher-order reasoning and forming
higher-order knowledge of b. His rst-order warrant is more than sufcient to justify him
to rely on b.
Assuming HORK has other implausible consequences. First, according to Williamson’s
account, a progressive increase of stakes would give rise to an increasing demand of
higher-order reasoning and knowledge iterations in order for the subject to be regarded
as appropriately relying on a proposition for practical reasoning. Now, while it still
seems somewhat intuitive that in some high-stakes contexts one should engage in
second-order reasoning,14 it sounds rather odd to also demand the subject to engage in
a third-order reasoning about whether to trust the second-order reasoning about whether
to trust the rst-order reasoning. After all, the decision to be made in such cases is about
the rst-order question whether to treat q as a premise in practical reasoning.
11 This is easy to imagine if we consider cases in which the only way in which a subject can acquire
higher-order beliefs is through higher-order reasoning, but the subject didn’t yet engage in any such
higher-order reasoning.
12 Williamson recognizes this type of case, see Williamson (2000: 95, 107–8, 115). We can also conceive
cases in which it is metaphysically impossible for the subject in possession of a strong rst-order-war-
ranted belief that q to form higher-order knowledge that q. Consider the case in which q is the prop-
osition that the subject has no second-order attitudes.
13 I conceive the case as one in which the source of information is more reliable than the original bank
case. If one doesn’t nd the case helpful, one is free to change the case in accordance with what she
thinks is necessary in order to select the reliable source.
14 After all, in such circumstances, it is reasonable for one to be reectively conscious of one’s epistemic
position with respect to q when the practical costs for being wrong about q are severe, and a failure to
engage in a second-order evaluation would be reckless and irresponsible.
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A third-order reasoning seems to be simply off the track in adjudicating the initial question
concerning what to do. In this respect, appealing to higher-order reasoning in accounting
for intuitive judgments about paradigmatic high-stakes cases appears to be a misplaced
strategy.
It is also excessively pretentious to ask high-stakes subjects to engage in many levels of
reasoning and possess many iterations of knowledge. For one thing, when ordinary people
engage in deliberation about whether to perform a certain action, they rarely or never raise
questions about whether they know the premises in their deliberations, let alone questions
about even higher-order knowledge (cf. Greco 2014: 170). Concerning the maximal iter-
ation of knowledge one can properly attribute, there is empirical evidence that neurotypi-
cal adults can only reliably track higher-order interpersonal mental state attribution, as in
“Mary thinks that Tom doubts that Vivian hopes to stay”, at most for ve levels
(Kinderman et al. 1998; Stiller and Dunbar 2007). Presumably, higher-order intrapersonal
knowledge attributions are subject to similar or even stricter natural limits. Engaging in
very high orders of reasoning about knowledge iterations is denitely impossible for nor-
mal human beings given our inability to properly track many levels of reasoning.
Having higher-order knowledge and engaging in higher-order reasoning may not be
necessary for one to be regarded as appropriately using q as a premise in practical reason-
ing in high stakes, but would it be at least sufcient? There are reasons to think that the
answer is no. One may say that higher-order knowledge of q is indirectly relevant to q. But
still merely having higher-order knowledge doesn’t necessarily strengthen the warrant for
q. As we saw above, there are trivial and hence luminous and maximally safe conditions
for which the anti-luminosity argument cannot prevent innite knowledge iterations.
Now, suppose a subject S# has several knowledge iterations of q about a luminous condi-
tion C. No matter how many knowledge iterations S# has, we can conceive cases in which
stakes on q are so high that S# would not be regarded as appropriately using q as a premise
in practical reasoning. Many share the intuition that it would be inappropriate and impru-
dent to bet on any proposition whatsoever when stakes on q are sufciently high, includ-
ing propositions we take to be tautologies.15
There are cases in which engaging in higher-order reasoning and acquiring higher-
order knowledge would even be regarded as inappropriate and detrimental for subjects
in high stakes. These cases constitute counterexamples to both necessity and sufciency
directions in HORK. Consider, for example, cases in which an exclusive focus on
rst-order considerations is mandatory in order to complete important tasks. Take a
case in which a pilot is trying to land a full-loaded aircraft on a river with broken engines.
Any reection about rst-order practical reasoning (e.g., whether she really knows that
pushing further a lever would have such and such consequences) could distract her
from completing crucial procedures for a safe landing.16 Similar considerations apply to
higher-order knowledge: imagine the pilot has not yet formed a higher-order belief
about what she knows concerning emergency landings and is in the position to form it
only by engaging in higher-order reasoning. Since she shouldn’t engage in higher-order
reasoning, she may also lack the corresponding second-order knowledge.
15 See e.g., Hawthorne (2004: 29, fn. 72), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008: 587), Fantl and McGrath
(2009: 189), and Reed (2010: 228–9).
16 The case is inspired by a similar one in Markovits (2011: 157) which in turn draws on a real case. In
the same article you can nd other similar cases.
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In sum, in this section I have argued that engaging in higher-order reasoning and/or
having higher-order knowledge seems neither necessary nor sufcient for the subject to
be regarded as appropriately relying on the target proposition in practical reasoning in
certain high stakes situations. This constitutes a serious problem for Williamson’s account.
As shown in this section, what really matters in determining whether it is appropriate to
use q as a premise in one’s practical reasoning in a context is the degree of rst-order war-
rant for that proposition, and these are not obviously related to the number of knowledge
iterations.
4. non-luminosity, higher-order belief and blameworthiness
For the sake of argument, let us grant with Williamson that it is reasonable to regard S*’s
failure to engage in a second-order reasoning as imprudent and that having or lacking
higher-order knowledge plays an important role in explaining why we would blame S*
for relying on p in her practical reasoning. In this section, I want to question that a
lack of second-order knowledge for the reasons provided by Williamson’s anti-luminosity
argument can do this explanatory work. For Williamson, the lack of second-order knowl-
edge is due to the failure of a safety requirement on belief. This cannot explain why S*
should be considered imprudent for failing to have second-order knowledge. In general,
blaming someone for being imprudent requires some wrongdoing for which the subject
is fully responsible, and thus which is recognisable from her own perspective. A proper
explanation of this blame in the second-order knowledge failure would require that this
failure be due to a lack of reasonable second-order belief – a belief that one knows q.
Unfortunately, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument doesn’t show failure of second-
order knowledge due to failure of reasonable second-order belief.
Let me elaborate this point a little further. In the anti-luminosity argument, Williamson
aims to show that any non-trivial condition is not luminous. The original argument con-
siders cases involving indiscriminable transitions between a situation in which a condition
clearly obtains (e.g., feeling cold) and one in which it clearly fails to obtain (i.e., feeling
hot). In these cases there is a point at which the subject is condent that, for example,
she feels cold at a time αi, which is true but unsafe, i.e., such that at a very close time
αi+1 the subject is still condent that she feels cold but it is not true that she feels cold.
Luminosity fails precisely in these circumstances, in which one’s condence about a rele-
vant proposition (e.g., that one feels cold), although true, is not safe from error, i.e., it is
not reliably based. The argument applies to every other non-trivial condition, including
knowledge itself.
This specic feature of the argument is particularly important for our discussion of
Williamson’s account: if S*’s knowledge that p is non-luminous due to the reason pro-
vided by the anti-luminosity argument (i.e., lack of safety), it is compatible with the con-
clusion of the anti-luminosity argument that S* is condent enough to believe that she
knows p. Indeed, Williamson’s argument is compatible with cases in which the subject
is in a position to reasonably believe that she knows p, but not in a position to know
that she knows p, due to the fact that that belief is unsafe.
It seems uncontentious that one can be blameless even if one’s second-order belief falls
short of knowledge, provided that the belief meets minimal rationality demands. An obvi-
ous example is provided by the barn façade case, in which a failure of knowledge is due to
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a modal environmental condition. Most philosophers agree that in such cases the subject’s
belief is justied, or at least reasonable and excusable, and therefore it is not worthy of
blame. Prudential blameworthiness seems not to be related to the failure of external con-
ditions on knowledge, such as the lack of safety or sensitivity. Rather, for being blameless
to φ in this sense, many hold that it is sufcient to have reasonable belief that one should φ,
though one shouldn’t φ. A subject who acts on what she reasonably believes is fully excus-
able, and thus not blameable as imprudent.
If this is correct, assuming KNP, the subject cannot be considered imprudent in cases in
which she reasonably believes that she knows q but doesn’t know that she knows q. Since
a failure of the safety condition doesn’t undermine any of the conditions for having a rea-
sonable second-order belief, the non-luminosity of knowledge in high stakes has no direct
relevance to whether one is blameable as imprudent or not. So a subject in a high-stakes
situation who reasonably believes that she knows q is prudentially blameless in holding
the second-order belief and in using q as a premise in her practical reasoning, even though
her second-order belief is unsafe (and thus the subject doesn’t know that she knows q).
Therefore, the reason why luminosity fails for knowledge (according to the anti-
luminosity argument) doesn’t explain why S* would be blameworthy if she were relying
on p in practical reasoning.17
In the case of S*, our intuition that it would be blameworthy for S* to treat p as a rea-
son in practical reasoning is not due to her lack of second-order knowledge. At most it
could be due to the fact that S* cannot reasonably believe that it is appropriate to rely
on p. But Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument doesn’t show that in cases in which lumi-
nosity fails, one is also not in the position to reasonably believe oneself to be in the rele-
vant condition.
It might be argued that in typical high-stakes cases exemplied in the literature, should
the subjects believe that their rst-order beliefs constitute knowledge, those second-order
beliefs would be not only unsafe, but also unreasonable, and thus blameworthy. These
cases are set up in such a way that it seems clear to the subjects themselves that the evi-
dential grounds for their rst-order beliefs are not very robust, not enough to possess iter-
ated knowledge of the relevant proposition. If these subjects were considering whether
they know the relevant proposition, the reasonable attitude for them to take would be
agnosticism. Thus, although we can in principle separate the belief’s properties of being
unreasonable and of being unsafe from error, in practice it seems very hard to distinguish
them in those high stakes cases. As a result, in all these cases the subjects would be con-
sidered blameworthy for not suspending judgment on whether they know the relevant
propositions.18
Nonetheless, even admitting that lack of reasonability and of safety from error cannot
be easily separated in standard high-stakes cases, the point still remains that in those high-
stakes cases the blameworthiness for relying on p in practical reasoning is due to the
unreasonableness, not the unsafety, of the second-order belief that p. Williamson’s
account would still be wrong in virtue of appealing to the wrong explanans (viz.,
17 Similar arguments apply to other iterations of knowledge as well. By discriminating reasonable belief
from safe belief, we can see that iterations of knowledge are not directly related with prudential
blameworthiness.
18 I am indebted to a referee of this journal for encouraging me to address this point.
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anti-luminosity and lack of safety), even if it were eventually able to provide the right ver-
dict for most high-stakes cases.
Furthermore, it is not difcult to nd high-stakes cases in which it seems fully reason-
able for the subject to believe that one knows the relevant proposition, even though that
belief is unreliable. Williamson’s account fails to provide the correct verdicts about these
cases, since the lack of second-order knowledge doesn’t prevent the reasonability and
blamelessness of holding second-order belief and of relying on the relevant proposition
in practical reasoning.
Consider a specic example similar to the case of feeling cold in the original
anti-luminosity argument.19 Suppose that an investor allocates a certain capital in an
investment with the expectation of a future nancial return. The return on her investment
has the property of growing slowly but stably in value when economic circumstances are
favourable, but of collapsing below the initial value in unfavourable circumstances.
Though circumstances are favourable now, a downturn might occur in the near future.
Assume that the investor is a normal risk-averse subject: her marginal utility decreases
with an increase in monetary value. The investor is reasonably disposed to keep her invest-
ment until it passes a certain threshold, after which it would be too risky not to sell (i.e.,
the expected disutility of the loss would be higher than the expected utility of the gain).
Suppose also that throughout the process the investor regularly considers whether she
knows that the investment is not risky at the moment. The case is designed in such a
way that the risk of not selling the investment grows very slowly, almost imperceptibly,
but steadily, as happens in Williamson’s original case with the feeling of heat. As in
that case, the investor’s power of discriminating the value is limited: the investor cannot
discriminate any signicant change in risk within a few hours (though she can over several
days). The subject is very condent that the investment is not risky at the beginning, and
then her condence gradually diminishes with the growth of risk. In this respect, the sub-
ject’s condence at each stage of this process should be considered as reasonable as that of
the subject in Williamson’s original case. An application of the anti-luminosity argument
shows that there is a time t at which the subject’s belief that she knows that the investment
is not risky is true and reasonable but unsafe, i.e., such that it is too close to a case in
which the subject loses knowledge that the investment is not risky.20 In this case, it
seems that at time t the subject is not blameworthy for taking herself to know that the
investment is not risky and for not selling. The situation is analogous to the original ‘feel-
ing cold’ case, where the subject is not unreasonable or blameworthy for believing that she
feels cold when this belief is unsafe just for an indiscriminable margin. Nonetheless, at
time t our investor lacks knowledge that she knows that the investment is not risky.
Williamson’s account predicts the wrong result about this case, since the lack of
second-order knowledge doesn’t prevent the reasonability and blamelessness of holding
second-order belief that one knows and of relying on the relevant proposition in practical
19 Thanks to Davide Fassio for helpful discussions on this type of cases.
20 Note that in the close case in which the subject loses knowledge that the investment is not risky, the
loss of knowledge is due to the unsafety of the belief that the investment is not risky, not the falsity of
that belief. Otherwise, at time t, the subject would already lose knowledge that the investment is not
risky since her belief in the relevant proposition at time t would be unsafe.
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reasoning.21 This type of case shows that Williamson’s account is doubly wrong: not only
does it identify the explanans with the wrong property (iterated knowledge instead of rea-
sonable belief), but it also fails to predict rational behaviour in a range of cases in which
conditions for blameworthiness come apart from those for safety.22
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